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Discourse Postponing elections and extending the presidency: A study of political legality and the progress of Indonesia's democratic practice

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Abstract---This literature review aims to discuss the discourse of postponing elections and requests for an extension of the term of office of the President of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2024 period. This is an issue that is currently being discussed in the country. On that basis, we have compiled literature discussing the issues above. An information data collection model, and we have to understand something that is currently phenomenal. The review process involves a sharp devaluation of the data, careful coding, and extracting digests that answer the problem with high validity. Our data search was done online on several published data sources that we marketed from 2010 to 2022. Several scientific publications on the political science of regional elections and democracy, especially in Indonesia, have been interviewed. The President of the Republic of Indonesia is a constitutional discourse according to the laws of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore all elements have the right to remind the Government and political figures to be loyal and obedient to the official Constitution.

Keywords---political discourse, postponement of elections throughout the presidential term, socio-political studies of democracy.

Introduction

Talks about extending the term of office of the President or serving three terms resurfaced after several political meetings in the alliance of public authorities, in particular political parties such as the Golkar, the National Awakening Party, and the National Mandate Party, conveying their views to the media to delay the 2024 presidential election for as long as possible from 1 to 2 years (Muzakkir et al., 2021). Talks about postponing a political party are very complicated because there is no solid reason for prolonging and postponing the election. The debates and petitions put forward by political parties are more about political interests and temporary advantages undermined by first-class decisions. The talks also have other possible impacts, particularly the extension of the President's term of office and the election of different institutions through elections such as the legislative member's assembly, Regional members council, and even local head leaders (Widyana & Fikriansyah, 2021). Instead of focusing on its duties in supervising the implementation of the Government amid the COVID-19 Pandemic so that it can follow up its responsibilities according to the schedule according to the provisions of the Constitution, ideological groups that are important to groups in the House of Representatives propose ways that deviate from the regulatory aisle and legal, constitutional guidelines (Syawawi, 2020).

Nonetheless, it is perceived that this proposed suggestion comprises a sensible infringement of the Constitution. Since Article 22E passage (1) of the 1945 Constitution has underlined that choices are made once predictably, and Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution specifies that the term of office of the President and Vice President is fixed, precisely five years, and should be reappointed for one term (Pakpahan, 2019). Likewise, our Constitution rules out the deferment of the political race or expansion of the terms of office of the President and Vice President. The deferment of the political race may likewise have the option to discolor the quintessence of the state since it disregards the obligations of the state contained in the Constitution. What is more, postponing the political race is equivalent to deferring the reclamation of the Government, which should keep on hurrying to stay away from too lengthy in power, which can open up degenerate practices. The revision of the Constitution with the sole inspiration driving the deferment of the General Election and the expansion of the term of office of the President and Vice President, both through formal and relaxed channels, is a type of selling prominence based on values contained in the Constitution (Wijaya and Erwinta, 2020). While the positive side of constitutionalism hopes to restrict power, ensure significant opportunities, and control the genuine development of state associations. In this way, it is unseemly to reexamine the Constitution to postpone the execution of the General Election. The development of political races appears to underline that the justification behind the state is for power, not the most significant benefit of the individual (Reuter, 2015).

A susceptible situation cannot promptly be blamed to delay the political race and expand the term of office of the President and Vice President. It ought to be perceived that every time President and Vice President have difficulties understanding their projects, each has their procedure for making these difficulties inside a foreordained timeframe. In this way, in confronting the difficulties of running the public authority during the present well-being crisis,

the President and his positions and ideological groups as a component of the group in the DPR ought to observe an answer that can be executed in the following two years before the period closes, not more caught up with examining the augmentation of the public authority time frame (Ramadani & Rezah, 2021).

Answering the talk against the Constitution, the Indonesian Center for Law and Policy Studies desires 1) The President and all ideological groups that are grouped in the DPR to be steadfast and mindful in completing the arrangements of the Constitution, remembering holding races for time and doing whatever it takes not to expand the term of office of the President and Vice President. 2) Political elites and local area pioneers are to set a guide to general society and exhibit state morals as an aspect of their responsibility's obligations. 3) The President, Vice President, and DPR ought to zero in on incomplete schoolwork within two years before the General Election (Horowitz, 2013). The schoolwork being referred to is freeing Indonesia from the well-being crisis because of Covid-19, speeding up monetary recuperation, settling land getting issues, and other fundamental liberties infringement, including expanding the short, participatory and responsible authoritative work of the house representative members.

Agus Riswanto (2020) said that oligarchs face reality regarding the discussion about the expansion of official terms on Twitter online entertainment. According to him, the conversation about the conversation was not excessive, and most netizens did not agree with the issue. This is related to the Social Network Analysis (NSA) impact. The conversation on Twitter for virtual entertainment was fortified after the three general administrators of the alliance of public authorities. From the SNA map on Twitter, only one netizen opposed setting this addition. To date, the ringer group that supports it has not emerged. Beat has been authorized to quote the tweet. According to many circles, there is a high level of conversation on online entertainment Twitter that there are voices of leaders and the public, including students who oppose the discourse, which is echoed by social media, making netizens reject this assumption. "Most netizens rejected the extension of the President's term of office. In addition to raising individual disputes, netizens also questioned the figures who proposed postponing the regional elections until 2027 (Putra Fandika, 2020).

Suhariono et al. (2021) revealed that netizens who were effectively linked to discussions about extending the term of office were so rebuffed that this was not an exaggeration with Muhaimin Iskandar's statement that 100 million Indonesian netizens needed an extension of President Jokowi's term of office. "Not up to 18 million Indonesian Twitter clients. Moreover, 100 million does not seem legit. Most of the world's records answer the talks about expanding the official term. The high record value confirms this demonstrated natural as much as 76.03 percent. Then again, bot accounts that "From the absolute record that talks about this issue, there are 5,006 notes, or 60.61 percent are natural records," The discussion on the extension of the term of office began with the narrative of the General Chair of the PKB, Muhaimin Iskandar. He revealed that this is a longing from the region after breaking down considerable information through virtual entertainment (Feka, 2020).

Political elites are getting more grounded in conveying the delay of the 2024 political race and the augmentation of the President's term of office. Something

like three DPR parties have this sign of help: PKB, Golkar, and PAN. As a matter of fact, given a news site report, the General Chair of the Golkar Party and the coordinating Minister for the Economy, Airlangga Hartarto, expressed that President Jokowi had requested him to push for the deferment of the 2024 General Election (Davidson, 2018). The desires of the elites are in opposition to the Indonesian Constitution. Article 7 and 22 section (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia guarantee that the President and VP hold office for quite a long time and from there on can be reappointed similarly situated, just for one term of office, through broad races held in Luber and Jurdil like clockwork one time each year. Taking everything into account, delaying the 2024 General Election abuses the most elevated Law of the Republic of Indonesia (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019).

Despite this, party elites in the parliament occasionally increase their assistance to alter racial resilience and break official tenure (Habibi, 2021). Article 37 paragraph (1) and Paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia carefully, the proposed amendments to the articles of the Basic Law are prepared approximately one-third $1/3$ by changing no less than $2/3$ of absolute people. Some political parties only need a few more meetings to propose sacred changes with the regional representative councils. Then, at the time, the enormous legislative alliance supporting President Jokowi's administration was all anyone needed to undo the change (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018). Indonesia faces challenges and conflicts in implementing elections in the reform era. This correction is a simple action because it contradicts the constitutionalism of limiting power by limiting the term of office, which is brought into the world from the historical background of the country's journey and is an order for change (Rangkuti, 2020).

Deferring the 2024 political race and broadening the official term caused Indonesia to abuse the guideline of the official Government. As a feature of the political framework coming about because of the Reformation, the official framework has two crucial contrasts with the parliamentary framework. Initial, an administration that is isolated from the parliament. Second, the President as head of Government has a proper term of office and is restricted by direct decisions by individuals consistently.

Financial reasons in connection with Covid-19 also contradict previous government actions. In the 2020 Pilkada, pollution and life from the crown have peaked (Iriani et al., 2021). Academia across fields, NGOs, interfaith associations, and students have asked for no postponement of the Pilkada and an extension of the presidential term of office by 2024. The financial condition of citizens and the state is worrisome due to the impact of Covid-19 cannot be used as an excuse. However, the public and legislative authorities will continue with the 2024 Pilkada. All of this makes sense that the postponement of political decisions in 2024 and the extension of the presidential term abuses legal, political, and monetary points of view. As with the continuation of the 2020 Pilkada, the postponement of the 2024 General Election is a form of state organization considering world-class political interests to pursue and even expand its power. We as citizens must reject the postponement of the 2024 political decision and the extension of the term of office. For the sake of Law and order, the problem of a

majority government, and economic strengthening: rejecting the postponement of the 2024 General Election (Power, 2018).

Method

In the method and data collection section, we will describe the procedure for conducting the study that we aim to gain an understanding of the discourse on postponing elections and the length of the presidential term that we pursue in our study of political law and the progress of the democratic process in Indonesia (Ramadani & Rezah, 2021). To discuss this problem, we have obtained several data that we believe we can answer with the principle of high validity and reliability. We have obtained the data from several scientific publications in the form of scientific articles and information from websites, perhaps from newspapers and magazines politics (Sobari, 2017).

After getting the data, we examined it in the phenomenological approach method to get as much data as possible. We came up with something whose volume we believe is capable of providing new answers, such as a qualitative study that involves, among other things, coding data, critically analyzing data and information, and interpreting it so that we get a comprehensive answer. Moreover finally, we try to conclude and discuss them as study findings. This study fully obtained supporting data from publications in the form of secondary data literature that we searched electronically on the Google Search search engine, namely Google Scholar, which we marketed in documents published between 2010 and 2002 relating to the discourse on regional elections and their beauty and democracy, the journey of democracy in Indonesia. Indonesia. Thus, among other things, our process of finding the journey of this political, scientific literature review and the final report (Rasyidin, 2021).

Discussion

Election postponement and political race

At the point when the Government, legislative, and Election Organizers "concurred" and put it down on the calendar for the National Election on February 14, 2024, and the Simultaneous Pilkada on November 27, 2024, all gatherings were worried about improving the administration of the execution (James & Alihodzic, 2020). The General Election Commission ought to interpret the Constitutional Court Decision No.55/PUU-XVII/2019, which gives six elective Constitutional Simultaneous Election Models in the KPU Regulation. In the interim, the KPU likewise made different enhancements to the substance of the P-KPU by alluding to the consequences of the assessment of the past races, so the execution of the Presidential, legislative, regional representatives, and local legislators races could be better even though the time corresponded with the holding of Simultaneous regional head election. Even though the KPU's condition is as yet temporary because the D day of the General Election and Pilkada matches with the enrollment of new chiefs. Besides, the choice outcomes showed that only one old face official was abandoned. Nonetheless, this cannot be blamed to endure the KPU's presentation because institutionally, the KPU is now long-lasting, so the congruity of execution should be kept up (Kassa & Grace, 2020).

However, the fact of the matter is not like that. What has as of late surfaced and turned into a talk in the broad communications is the issue of deferring the holding of the 2024 Simultaneous National and Regional Elections? Astonishingly, the broad communications announced that ideological group authorities raised the issue. The 2024 Simultaneous National and Regional Elections have been deferred. Even though the legislators, whose seats "have a place" for ideological groups, have consented to mark the calendar for the occasion. Albeit by and large, in the long history of a majority rules system, Indonesia has "delayed" the holding of general decisions, with the goal that they are not held as commanded by the Constitution at regular intervals, particularly during the Sukarno and Suharto organizations. Nonetheless, the political circumstances and conditions were altogether different from the present, and the "custom of infringement" should not be imitated and kept up with consistently. It should be a shared obligation to develop it further (Vashchanka, 2020).

In addition, the talk on the deferment of the 2024 Simultaneous General Election and Pilkada is likewise managing the issue of broadening power, both for the workplace of the President, bureau, administration, and individuals from the center and regional legislators, in any event, prompting the issue of the workplace of the President for three terms (Jens, 2017). This has also clouded the centralization of different gatherings to participate in achieving and improving the Simultaneous General Election and Regional Head Elections and opening up a public talk that is progressively confounding and hard to represent. Like this, it would be shrewder to assume the talk on the deferment of the 2024 Simultaneous General Election and Regional Head Elections was promptly halted. It is an ideal opportunity to carry individuals to a more inventive talk to add to the KPU to plan the execution of the 2024 Simultaneous General Election and Pilkada to be better, to create better public pioneers (Poole & Rosenthal, 2017).

It is the ideal opportunity for all gatherings to energize the holding of decisions not exclusively to satisfy the necessities of a majority rules government by being caught in juridical procedural achievement. Decisions are effective simply because they conform to the strategies framed by the regulation. In the races that have been held more than multiple times, the time has come to zero in on making meaningful progress, specifically the appointment of pioneers who are great at deciding approaches to measure up to individuals' assumptions; side with individuals, which so fundamental necessities, fuel, LPG, essential power taxes, cost taxes, and individuals' fundamental requirements will not increment once more (Lewis & Kew, 2015).

Political decisions are viewed as a tyrant system

Postponement of elections is proof that a country is not democratic, even for whatever reason. Political decision delays come from non-popularity countries. Because their democratic situation is dim, this is a picture of the authoritarian state engendered by the delay of political decisions, particularly in Russia. The country that sent the attack on Ukraine agreed to correct the Basic Law (Erikson et al., 2020). The country experienced a tactical breakdown due to extending the term of office to three terms. So be careful; play with the proposed addition of the

period. Election delays cause problems for the problem-based framework. Postponing the 2024 election decision will raise five issues with a popularity-based framework in Indonesia. First is the emergence of vulnerabilities in governance issues. Second, the majority rule framework is deteriorating. Third, Indonesia's popularity base framework from 1945 to the 1960s. Fourth, there is confusion among parties who decide and approve the addition of the term of office. This is because the postponement of political competition affects the term of office of the legislature. Fifth, it led to government delegitimization, instability, and the potential for struggle in the eyes of the public. Assuming these conditions are left unchecked, the stakes are the development of a large proportion of oppression that ignores minorities (Repucci, 2020).

The decline of Indonesian democracy

Observers surveyed that the proposal to postpone political decisions was unreasonable and counter-beneficial to the turn of events and the vote-based framework fabricated up to this point (Power, 2018). Decisions and the course of power that are standard become the energy of individuals or communities as owners of power within the framework of the majority rule to make compensation. "The political race is a tool to control the running of Government, both in the leader and in the council. This implies that legal decisions are the establishment for our election of a majority rule system, in which case the establishment is handled, upgrading our voting system will pose difficulties. According to Aspinall et al. (2020) routine decisions and changes in strength are the essential steps, so they should not be angry. Every time anger is sure to create trouble, and it has been proven that elections can take place consistently for more than 20 years, and the region or the public places tremendous trust in the framework that is being built. Although it must be admitted that there is usually a dispute whenever there is a political race, it can be resolved over time. At the local level, this also implies that improving the majority system in Indonesia is very good (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019).

Jati (2021) expressed that in the political history of post-popularity-based Indonesia, there has never been a postponement in the execution of a political race since there was what was happening that constrained it to delay. Due to the pandemic circumstance, the timetable for nearby races' political elections has been deferred. All things being equal, he proceeded, it should be recalled that there is a system for selecting carrying out authorities and others if postponing neighborhood races. In the meantime, neighborhood races to choose territorial heads are not the same as broad or public races. "What is more, we know that in practically all nations, when the Pandemic hits, many individuals reschedule. If the 2024 political decision is delayed for unclear reasons, it may be risky; individuals could lose trust in the majority rule framework that has been fabricated. Schäfer (2019) accepts that delaying the political decision is an extreme cycle. Particularly regarding Indonesia, where the 1945 Constitution commands an overall political race to be held like clockwork. Postponing intends there should be changes to the Constitution, and to change the Constitution is not as natural as envisioned. Decisions might be delayed assuming convincing reasons are found; for instance, Indonesia is experiencing the same thing or is confronting a pandemic.

Mietzner (2014) is not experiencing the same thing. It is the case that we are confronting a pandemic; the facts confirm that the country is battling with numerous things yet is not in an emergency. The Pandemic is still there, yet we can oversee it, so the justification for the postponement is a troublesome starting point until further notice," he made sense of. Also, during the two years of the Pandemic, individuals have gotten sufficient schooling and have had the option to put resources into a better approach to life. The people group is thought of as strong in the Pandemic, and immunization inclusion is very high. Wawan evaluates that the local area appears to be prepared for the 2024 political race. The immediate decisions that ought to have been held in 2019 and delayed to 2020 because of the Pandemic have become an adequate experience. "Although it was delayed a pandemic yet, the nearby decisions that occurred were intriguing because the support rate was very high, and there was no proof that there had been spread or grouping. We need to regard that experience and society is sufficiently able to manage such circumstances (Arifianto, 2019).

Whether various elites' ideological groups demand postponing, said Wawan, safeguarding power is viewed as a solid intention behind this longing. They need to sustain the power they at present have without the issue of planning for decisions. Indeed, even this raises doubts about the ineptness of ideological groups in battle in decisions (Warburton & Aspinall, 2019). The electability review is not supported, particularly by the elites who propose because they are not prepared and incapable of persuading the public. "By postponing their positions and powers, be it in parliament or somewhere else. So that is more, we think different intentions are difficult to come by. We realize what is happening makes us battle. However, we are not experiencing the same thing; there is no political and monetary emergency. Subsequently, he recommended that ideological groups with a conglomeration work with all the explanation of interests turn into the energy to get ready and show their best exhibition openly. How might they contribute through their individuals in the legislators, provincial heads, or their units who become local heads to substantiate themselves to the public that they can survive and can assist this country with escaping the present Pandemic (Tanuwidjaja, 2010).

Repetition of the new order

The constraint of the official term of office ought not to be deciphered exclusively by one measure and is simply legitimate formalistic. This will have protected ramifications for each occupant president who will attempt to sustain his power (official continues) by evolving, staying away from, reworking, correcting the Constitution, or, in any event, eliminating the article restricting the official term in Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution (Rukmana, 2015). Prior to the change. In this detailing, it tends to be perceived that the plan of the article controls the term of office of the President yet does not give essential cutoff points concerning the service time restriction the President and VP in Indonesia for the number of terms they can serve. The substance of the article in regards to the term of office of the President is exceptionally not entirely clear with the goal that there is a chance for a President to hold office constantly as Sukarno and Suharto did. During the rule of President Soeharto, there were deviations from the 1945 Constitution. President Soeharto exploited the shortcomings contained in the 1945 Constitution

to sustain his power. There was a legitimate item as MPR Decree No. I/MPR/1978 concerning the MPR Rules of Procedure, which contains the assurance of MPR individuals to protect the Constitution and do not wish to make changes to the 1945 Constitution (Samosir, 2021).

During the official political decision during the Soeharto period, a solitary up-and-comer generally showed up with President Soeharto's goal was to choose persistently. During the New Order time, the power construction of the President was depicted as a pyramid that was cone-shaped to the top where every political choice and government strategy was in the area of one individual, specifically President Suharto. This made the administration in Indonesia in the New Order time a significant number of the positions held by the military. With solid help from the military, particularly from the Army and from the Golkar area, the New Order had the option to keep up with its standard in Indonesia for a considerable length of time. This should be visible in the aftereffects of the races in 1971, 1977, and 1982, where Golkar won the political decision with 64%, while PPP was 28% and PDIP was 8%. Aside from that, there were likewise delegates from class agents and agents from ABRI, upwards of 96 individuals (Yusuf & Sterkens, 2015).

This model of political arrangement and the New Order government was subsequently shown to be influential in smoothing Suharto's way to becoming President in 32 years or six political race periods. Hence, having a reasonable meaning of the constraint of the official term of office is fundamental. For instance, in the constitutions of Brazil in 1997 and Argentina in 1993, it is expressed that the official service time boundary briefly back to back official term. The Brazilian and Argentinian models are remembered for the sacred class. Another model is President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela (1999-2013), who was President who was chosen once at regular intervals beginning in February 1999. Not long after, in April 1999, the President won a mandate which took into account the re-appointment of progressive presidents and broadened the term of office. The official term becomes six years.⁴ In December 1999, the Venezuelan Constitution endorsed Chavez's proposition above. In July 2000, Chavez was chosen for the second time as President and the first to fill in as President for a six-year term (Utomo et al., 2020).

Even in 2007, Chavez presented a proposition to broaden the official term for six to seven years, albeit, in the end, he barely lost in the political decision. Mandate.⁶ Thus, this study needs to break down the sacred ramifications that will emerge with the restriction of the official term of office managed in the Indonesian Constitution on the manageability of the President's office persistently (Khanif, 2021). The writer takes the examination title, to be specific, "State Implications of the Presidential Term Limit as per Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution before the Amendment to the Presidential Continue of the New Order Period". From the title of the exploration over, the writer will lead investigate with attention to the inquiries, in particular: (1) How were President Suharto's endeavors to stay away from the official service time boundary Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution before the revision?; (2) What are the ramifications of the official service time boundary official continues during the Soeharto time? The creator will make sense of these

two examination questions in the conversation subsection beneath to respond to these two examination questions.

The constraint of the service time restraint the President's term of office

There is an intriguing history of the term limit arrangements made by the United States constitution. Whenever George Washington filled in as leader of America for two terms from April 30, 1789, to March 3, 1797, and afterward, after his second term as President finished, he would not be reappointed in 1796.9 Washington was of the view that a president ought not to be reappointed as President to the third period, etc. Therefore, the American Constitution viewed that view as an unwritten standard endured in America for over a century. No president can fill in as President for multiple terms in the United States. As a matter of fact, on account of the strength of this standard, the Democrats surrendered their most grounded official applicant in the 1896 American official political decision and urged an American to attempt to kill Teddy Roosevelt in 1912.10 (Lee, 2020).

New issues emerged in 1940 when Franklin Roosevelt served for the third time as leader of America. Roosevelt's accomplishment, which had the option to deliver America once again from the monetary emergency amidst World War II, acquired him the trust of the American individuals as President for the third time. In the American official political race, Roosevelt won effectively from his rival Wendell Wilkie in 1944. Nonetheless, Franklin Roosevelt passed on from draining his mind in the center of his rule. Roosevelt's passing prompted changes in the American Constitution to restrict official terms (Lewis et al., 2020). America then brought forth the twenty-second protected revision, which brought about an official service time restraint in 1951, which expressed that the official term in America was just considered a limit of two terms.11 Examples of official service time restrictions that are somewhat unique are France and Switzerland. The French Constitution of 1795 and the Swiss Constitution of 1798 utilize the model of *primus inter pares* or leader power comprising five individuals; one of the five individuals will become President, and the official office pivots in turn from these five individuals consistently. None of the five can be reappointed by the committee without holding up five years between races (Djalante et al., 2020).

One more illustration of the official service time restriction is that Latin American nations are more unequivocal in drawing certain lines on the official term of office. For instance, President Simon Bolivar in 1819 expressed that Latin American pioneers had perceived that there was an unwritten standard in their country that there was nothing riskier than permitting a resident to go on in power as President for an extensive period. Nonetheless, he later adjusted his perspective by changing the Bolivian Constitution in 1826, so the officeholder president could select his successor. Learning from the instance of Bolivia, Latin American nations started to draw certain lines based on official conditions officially. Chile's Constitution, for instance, in 1822, specifies that the term of office of the President is six years for one official term with the chance of running for re-appointment for a term of just four years. It is different from the Argentine Constitution in 1819, which specifies that the term of office of the principal President should be upheld by a more significant part vote in all chambers of the

lawmaking body. In the subsequent term, the President who re-names requires at least 66% of the votes from the chamber (Diamond, 2020).

Presidential Continuism during the New Order

The occupant president has made different endeavors to do his term of office consistently. As indicated by Baturo, these endeavors can be "aversion," "development of signifying," "augmentation," and "expulsion," basically as coherence rehearses that are entirely aimed at resistance to sacred standards (Ulum, 2020). For additional subtleties on the President's endeavors in propagating his power by going amiss from the official service, time restrictions will be made sense of underneath: 1) Avoidance This training is standard in presidents who fill in as President persistently. From 1945 to 2017, thirteen instances of presidents precluding recently held terms in the wake of having another constitution taken on. Chavez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales did so when they had another constitution proclaimed from the get-go in their residency. This training is significantly more expected during the post-Soviet period of Russian presidents. The officeholder president's means in continuing the official term by avoidance were: a) obeying the formal official service time restraints disregarding the soul of the accepted Constitution so he remains President. Also, a viable political pioneer has some control over the abilities of the President or the manikin president he designates as his replacement. For instance, the leader of Nicaragua in 1947 and the President of Russia in 2008 (Kurniaty, 2020).

The occupant president can change his situation from President to state head or the other way around, regardless of established changes to fortify his situation in another office or debilitate the power of the official office he does not hold anymore. For instance, the President of Yugoslavia in 1997 and the President of the Philippines in 1976. Suspension of the official political race. For instance, the Philippines in 1972 and Angola in 1992. He was counting down the official term in the new Constitution. It implies making another term, particularly the term of office of the old President, with the old Constitution, which is not included in the new Constitution. For instance, Chavez, in his second term in office. Constitutional Amendments for Extension of Term by and by, this expansion of term of office does not remain solitary yet is joined with extra alterations to the number of prerequisites or different changes. For instance, Chavez not just stretched out the term from five to six years yet, in addition, presented prompt re-appointment (Susila et al., 2020).

There are a few models for expanding the term of office of the occupant president. The expression of office of the President without changing the time allotment in office in one period, e.g., were Russia in 2008, Uzbekistan in 2002. Amendment of the Constitution to permit re-appointment of the occupant official system; e.g., Peru in 1993, and Brazil in 1997. Amend the Constitution to permit another to serve on a specially appointed premise; for example, Korea in 1969 and Namibia in 1998. Elimination of Removal of President Juan Linz underlined that rather than majority rule legislatures, tyrant state-run administrations are "forever," as numerous contemporary despots have learned not to eliminate official service time restraints. Until the end of time. The conventional cancelation of official service time boundaries is not fundamental. Presidents just need to overhaul the

Constitution on a seven-to eight-year rhythm, each time disposing of the past term and asserting that their time in office is naturally restricted (Anwar, 2010).

Ramifications of expanding the political power

The contention underlies the creator picks the boundaries of the established ramifications of the official service time restraint. In the first place, an official service time restraint in the Constitution will causally influence the position and authority of the most significant state MPR in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2014). The MPR, as the most elevated state establishment, might encounter a shift if the President's power is so solid in controlling the parliament. Regarding the MPR's position to choose the President and VP and draft regulations, it is feasible to encounter a shift when the intercession of dominant power is exceptionally massive in parliament. Second, the ramifications for the official and lousy habit of official political decision models are conceivable. Since this authority is likewise in the MPR and DPR, the President is interested in controlling the course and methodology for the official political decision. Third, Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution states that the mediator's power will be submitted to Indonesia's most elevated legal organization before the change when understanding is completed (Fossati et al., 2020).

The Supreme Court, as the most elevated legal foundation, may likewise be impacted by the sacred impacts of the President's endeavors to bypass the official service time boundary. Fourth, the piece of parliament during the New Order time might move as indicated by the interests of the chief. This guarantees that the officeholder can win the official political race (Miichi & Kayane, 2020). Those portions of the contentions underlie the four boundaries of the official service time restraint's protected ramifications. The following will be examined the technique of this exploration. As a rule, the guideline with one proportion of the official service time restriction existed in the 1945 Constitution before the corrections have given an incredible open the door to President Soeharto to complete official continues for six decisions in Indonesia beginning in 1971-1997. The act of keeping away from the official service time restraint Suharto's different official continues endeavors has had sacred ramifications. President Suharto has four sacred ramifications in staying away from the official service time boundary endeavors (Syarif & Hannan, 2020).

The principal established ramifications is a change to the position and authority of the MPR as the most elevated state organization by Law, then, at that point, moving to a foundation that does not have the most elevated position in the state organization framework in Indonesia both accepted and by right. There are three signs of President Soeharto's infringement of the position and authority of the MPR as managed in the Indonesian Constitution preceding the alteration, which will be made sense of in the accompanying passage. To begin with, the infringement of the idea of individuals' sway in possession of the MPR as directed in Article 1 Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution before the correction stated, "Power has individuals, and is done altogether by parlements. "Practically speaking, the assurance of individual delegates who are individuals from the legislative, of the 460 seats available to all, 100 seats have been given to the Indonesian Armed Forces group.

The ABRI group itself has individuals usually are chosen and should acquire endorsement from the TNI Commander, the Minister of Defense, and the President himself. Ideological groups and Golkar challenge the excess 360 seats. Golkar itself was not initially a party but instead had the option to challenge the overall political decision in 1971 in light of Suharto's endorsement. Hence, Golkar won the political decision in 1971 with 236 seats, the PPP got 96 seats, and the PDI got 30 seats. Numerically, Golkar and the ABRI group joined with the number of seats in the MPR; they became a more significant part of parliament. As indicated by the creator, this is a type of the actual place of the MPR as the foundation holding the most noteworthy individuals' power as per the order of the Constitution, that the most elevated sway in the MPR has individuals not in possession of President Suharto (Oluyemi, 2020).

Second, the infringement of the arrangements on the assurance of individuals from the DPR in Article 19 Paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution before the revision, which stated:³⁷ "The piece of the not set in stone by regulation ."The DPR in Article 19 Paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution preceding this revision contained a legitimate arrangement that individuals from the DPR were chosen given the ActAct. The supposition will be that the Law here is not the President.

There are three signs of infringement of the state organization concerning the discretionary framework and the official political decision. In the first place, President Soeharto attempted to debilitate ideological groups by joining all parties that took part in the 1971 races into new party parts aside from Golkar with the establishment of Law Number 3 of 1975 concerning the Fusion of Political Parties in Indonesia. In this manner, the quantity of gatherings in Indonesia is just three 40 in 1973, the Islamic gatherings were converged into the United Development Party (PPP), which comprised a combination of the NU, Parmusi, PSII, and Parti parties. In the meantime, non-Islamic gatherings were converged into the Indonesian Democratic Party, specifically the PNI, Catholic, IPKI, and Murba parties. Eventually, the overshadowing of ideological groups through Law Number 3 of 1975 prevailed regarding making Golkar the champ of the administrative races and Suharto's political machine (Menchik, 2018).

Nonetheless, the New Order utilized the article to kill Indonesian residents who had political perspectives that were in opposition to the New Order's, no matter what their political perspectives on being partnered with the PKI or in any case. The combination of ideological groups into Islamic gatherings in PPP and patriot bunches in PDI demonstrates a solitary understanding of Article 2 Paragraph (1) letter c and the 1945 Constitution before the revision. Third, Article 6 Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution before the change states 43, "Fundamental on the President and Vice President Elected by the People's Consultative Assembly with the Most Votes. "Article 6 Paragraph (2) arrangements imply that the MPR chooses the President and his appointee with the most votes. Be that as it may, practically speaking, Golkar was the champ of the political decision for six races and the ABRI group of 100 individuals and provincial delegates who were chosen on the proposal of President Suharto (Wilson, 2015).

Ramifications of protected regulation

Specifically, the deciphering authority of Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution before the official service time boundary revisions. As the most noteworthy legal establishment during the New Order time, the Supreme Court had turned into an organization that needed to follow the desires of President Suharto. This is indivisible from the public authority's approach of making police officers go from examiners, police, and judges to government employees (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2015). Indeed, even in spending plan issues, the Attorney General's Office, the Supreme Court, the Judiciary, and the police are also under a similar rooftop as the service, which is heavily influenced by the public authority. With this model, the Supreme Court's clout in deciphering Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution before the corrections became obtuse and per orders from the New Order government. The sign is that there is no legal audit and, surprisingly, a survey of Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution before the alteration in the New Order period.

The fourth established ramifications are that the arrangement of parliament during the New Order time might move as indicated by the interests of the chief. In Article 1 Paragraph (3) letter c of Law Number 16 of 1969 concerning the Composition and Position of the MPR, DPR, and Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), it is expressed that Golkar from ABRI and Non-ABRI are resolved given appointment.⁴⁵ Regarding arrangements, it is managed in Article 1 Paragraph (4) letter c, which expresses that the arrangement through the President is either at the proposition of the association concerned or the drive of the President.⁴⁶ This is intriguing because individuals' delegates in the MPR, the individual who possesses them, is proposed by the President, who unexpectedly is the individuals agent sitting in the most elevated state establishment and can choose the President (HalimatusA'Diyah, 2015).

In the correction of Article 10, Paragraph (3), and Paragraph (4) of Law Number 5 of 1995 concerning Amendments to Law Number 16 of 1969 as Has Been Amended Several Times, the conclusion by Law Number 2 of 1985 directs the example of an official expert in deciding individuals' agents from Golkar ABRI as in the past Law. The thing that matters is the number of seats, from 100 to 75 seats. Second is the expansion of 25 seats for DPR individuals who come from non-ABRI Golkar and are chosen through races. The New Order has planned the political decision to ensure that Golkar generally wins the political race. This guarantees that the 425 seats of the ideological groups are constrained by Golkar, which is the party of the New Order government. So, it tends to be inferred that the presence of Article 10 Paragraph (3) demonstrates that the organization of individuals' agents in parliament has been managed and constrained by President Soeharto because the structure depends on the President's assurance of individuals' delegates who sit in the parlements (Butt, 2015)

Conclusion

Well, in this final section, we will conclude the essential points that we have reviewed from various application sources to gain an understanding of the evidence from field studies regarding the postponement of the election and also the extension of Jokowi's presidential term in the third period, namely the

upcoming 2024 election. This theme is indeed exciting to study, considering that today's volume in Indonesian society, especially the political elite, is between the pros and cons of extending the third presidential term and postponing the post-conflict local election in Indonesia. By containing various sources of information and regularly, we have collected essential points; among others, we note that the postponement of the election is a political reference in Indonesia driven by political party leaders, but it is very contrary to the institution and has so far drawn protests from various groups, especially netizens and netizens. Also students. The next thing we note, among others, is that the decisions of these politicians constitute a tyrannical system that must be restrained, considering that Indonesia is currently in an era of reform that must respect every political decision.

In the following presentation, we see that Indonesia is experiencing a decline in democratic practice, with the recent aspirations of the people not being accommodated optimally. Researchers have taken us far to play, so we need elemental control. Another critical point is that this is an attempt to reminisce and return to the new order era. The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Suharto, held politics double, namely as a military and civilian, contrary to the Constitution created since the reformation. Next, we examine find that this presidential postponement is a violation of the Constitution, and this has happened as in the past in some countries after they found various mixtures to control international politics where it was pretty easy to find many countries doing politics.

Furthermore, we also see that extending the term of office of the President is repeating what happened in the New Order era, so Indonesia is very anti. Because after entering a democratic period, every decision must be high. The last point we print is that the Ramification of the extension of the presidency is part of political power, which they have in particular by legislators and all play so that it is contrary to the mandate of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. We got this from various sources trying to understand what it is and how the discourse on population postponement occurred, and the request for an extension of the term of office of the President of the Republic of Indonesia for a third term.

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